Ideas about what is "fair" above and beyond the individuals'position in the income ladder determine preferences for redistribution. We study the dynamic evolution of di¤erent economies in which redistributive policies, perception of fairness, inequality and growth are jointly determined. We show how including fairness explains various observed relationship between inequality, redistribution and growth. We also show how different beliefs about fairness can keep two otherwise identical countries in di¤erent development paths for a very long time.
Introduction
The poor want to tax the rich, but that is not all what determines redistributive policies. Ideas about what is "fair" and views about what is an acceptable level of inequality above and beyond the individuals' position in the income ladder also matter. 1 The same level of inequality may be more or less acceptable by different individuals in di¤erent countries depending upon their beliefs that wealth has been accumulated with e¤ort and ability rather than by luck, connections or even corruption. In one word whether di¤erent levels of income and wealth are "deserved" or not.
2 These views about inequality and justice (which we may label "ideology") determine tax rates and the evolution of the distribution of income and wealth. But the latter itself generates changes in the proportion of income inequality due to e¤ort or to other factors including luck and government intervention, thus changing individual views about redistribution.
In this paper we provide a politico economic model that can trace over time the evolution of polices (tax rates and transfer schemes), the evolution of inequality, and the evolution of preferences for redistribution, as a function of changes in what is perceived as fair and unfair income di¤erences. The introduction of fairness in the perception of people regarding inequality reconciles several empirical observations which would be inconsistent with models based upon individual income (and position in the income ladder) as the only determinant of voter views about taxes and transfers.
In our model di¤erent generations of voters are linked by bequest, thus redistributive policies in the past and past beliefs about what was fair (or both) in ‡uence current generation views about fairness and inequality. These intergenerational links lead to long lasting e¤ects of current policies. We are especially interested in two types of experiment. One is how di¤erent initial conditions in di¤erent countries lead to long lasting di¤erences in policies. The other issue we study is how shocks to inequality imply di¤erent policy reactions.
Regarding the former experiment we can study not only di¤erences in the initial conditions of the economic system, but also, and perhaps more interestingly, di¤erences in views about social justice and views about the fairness of the inherited (at time zero) level of inequality. For instance two countries may be completely identical except for their views about the fairness of their initial inequality, and as a result they may adopt di¤erent redistributive policies over a long period of time which determines di¤erent income and inequality dynamics. These di¤erent patterns of taxation, inequality, and growth would be completely unexplainable without reference to initial views about what is fair or not, i. e. about social justice. The same applies when the two identical countries have di¤erent views about what is "fair" in terms of inequality. These examples allow us to explain, for instance, di¤erent levels of redistribution between the US and Europe and their persistence along the lines of Alesina and Glaeser (2004) who stressed, informally, the role of the perception of poverty as an explanation of US versus Europe. We also show that for some parameter values economies with di¤erent initial beliefs but otherwise identical converge slowly to the same steady state. But for other parameter values identical economies but with different initial beliefs converge to two di¤erent steady states, thus their di¤erences persist forever.
Another implication of our simulation is that, contrary to standard result from a Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework, more inequality may be associated with less redistribution. This is because di¤erent levels of measured inequality may be considered more or less fair. In addition, we can also analyze the case of di¤erent weights of rich and poor in the voting mechanism 3 . The second set of results concerns the e¤ect of shocks to income inequality like those generated by wars (Piketty and Saez, 2003) or possibly the 2008-2009 …nancial crisis. We show how shocks to inequality may generate very di¤erent policy reactions depending on the perception of individuals about who lost and who gained, namely if those who lost were those who were rich because of "luck" (broadly de…ned) or were those who had become rich because of e¤ort and ability. Thus the same measured changes in inequality may have di¤erent e¤ects on changes of redistributive policies depending on the nature of how these shocks are perceived. An innovative feature of our model is that we can trace precisely the evolution of income, inequality, and redistributive policies, but also the views about : "fairness" in society, that is we can measure how much of the observed inequality is considered acceptable and fair and which part is not and we can experiment on shocks to these views. This paper is related to the work of Alesina and Angeletos (2005a,b) but it is much richer in its dynamic dimension and it has a di¤erent voting mechanism. We adopt as our benchmark the same de…nition of fairness as theirs, but we also analyze di¤erent de…nitions and we emphasize the transition to the steady state, which may take a long time. Also, unlike those authors who use a median voter model, we adopt a probabilistic voting framework, which is a more ‡exible tool to analyze various types of distribution of political "power". The in ‡uence of beliefs about e¤ort as a determinant of redistributive policies has been analyzed in a di¤erent context by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . In their paper, beliefs are not shaped only by actual data, but also by agents' targets and psychological needs. In the present paper beliefs are consistent with reality. The fact that past experiences and views about history a¤ect beliefs is consistent with Piketty (1995) who analyzes the dependence of the redistributive preferences on past income.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model: both the economy and the political aspects of it, and the equilibrium. Section 3 illustrates the dynamic evolution of the model and performs several experiments. The last section concludes. The Matlab codes used in the present paper are available from the authors upon request.
The economy
We have non overlapping generations of individuals, indexed by t. Population is constant, there is one active individual per-family, and the total mass of families is normalized to the unit interval. Each individual, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], lives for one period and is characterized by a certain level of disutility of e¤ort, i > 0, luck, i 2 R, and inner abilities, A i > 0. These family-speci…c variables are fully persistent over time. Each individual i cares positively about how much of her wealth to consume, c it , and how much capital to bequeath to the next generation, k it , and negatively on his/her e¤ort, e it , on the job. All choice variables are constrained to be non-negative. The private utility function is:
0 < < 1. The …nal life pre-tax income is:
Let w it denote …nal life post-tax and transfer wealth. Each generation votes on the tax rate, t , which is proportionally applied to end-of-life income y it . All tax revenues are to be redistributed lump sum to all individuals. Hence,
where
y it di is the percapita public transfer. Government budget is always balanced. This warm glow intergenerational altruism implies that fraction of her end of life wealth is bequeathed, as seen by maximizing u it subject to c it + k it = w it . Therefore, plugging the optimal consumption and bequest into the private utility function, we obtain:
Individuals vote on taxation at the beginning of life, before the e¤ort choice is taken. Maximizing u it , using (3), (1), and (2), gives
which shows that individual e¤ort gets discouraged by expected taxation, and is increasing in the individual work ability and decreasing in the disutility of e¤ort 4 . The de…nition of a period in which a tax rate is constant for one generation, identi…ed as period, needs discussion. The equilibrium of the model is found below by computational methods and not in closed forms. it would be relatively straightforward to allow many periods within one generation and allow for a vote an a tax every period, so many votes and possible tax changes within one generation. However this complication would make the interpretation of the simulation more cumbersome and heavy. In addition, the choice of a "tax rate" should not be interpreted as the day to day or year to year changes in …scal policy, but the broad redistributive stand of a certain period in a certain country. Say more redistribution in the US with the Great Society in the sixties, or with the New Deal in the Thirties, less redistribution with the Reagan revolution and what followed. In Europe an increase in redistribution at the end of the sixties, etc.
Inequality and fairness
In addition to the standard utility function, we postulate that utility also depends negatively on some measure of inequality, i.e of income dispersion in society. In our benchmark case, as in Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) we posit that individuals tolerate inequality coming from innate ability and e¤ort, but are averse to inequality coming from everything else, luck and taxation. More speci…cally, let us de…ne "fair" utility and wealth as follows:
As mentioned before, each agent chooses k it = w it , where represents the generosity towards the next generation. Moreover, we can de…ne fair consumption, fair bequest, and fair disposable wealth as:
The generation t individual i utility, U it , is de…ned as:
and > 0 is the parameter which measures the importance of unfairness for society. This representation of utility implies that individuals in society dislike deviations from a distribution of wealth/utility in which everybody gets ONLY the bene…ts from e¤ort and innate ability. Note that the di¤erence between total wealth and fair wealth is due to luck and government intervention with taxes and transfers. The higher the tax rate, the lower the equilibrium choice of e¤ort; therefore the larger is the percentage of individual income due to luck rather than e¤ort, and the larger the proportion of di¤erences across individuals due to luck rather than e¤ort. In addition, to the extent that government transfers are NOT included in the de…nition of fair income because not due to e¤ort, this is an additional channel through which higher taxes induce a higher proportion of income perceived as not fair over the fair portion. While this is our benchmark case we also consider other cases in the numerical simulations of the model. In particular we consider situations in which tax and transfers are considered part of fair wealth: cases in which the e¤ect of A i as part of luck, i.e. being born smart is a lucky event; …nally, we consider the case in which individuals dislike inequality per se, namely any deviation of wealth and utility from equality for all at the average is costly. We will indeed compare the dynamic evolution of the economy under these di¤erent assumptions about tolerance for inequality and the de…nition of fairness.
The polity
As for the political process, we use a probabilistic voting model 5 . Thus we assume that there are two parties -L , for "left", and R, for "right" -each of which simultaneously and credibly commits to a tax rate P 2 [0; 1], P = L, R, at the beginning of each period -coinciding with a generation. The individuals vote for a party at the beginning of their life. Then the individuals choose e¤orts. The party that obtained the majority of the votes is the only one in o¢ ce, and it will apply the announced tax rate (to end of life incomes) and will redistribute accordingly. Finally, individuals choose their consumption and bequest.
Individuals have heterogeneous degrees of political party identi…cation 6 : in fact, the complete utility function is the following:
Variable P denotes the party that wins the election, and can take on values L ( meaning "left") or R ("right"). Indicator function L (P ) takes on value 1 if P = L and 0 if P = R. Random variable it represents individual i's pro-party L ideological bias, while " t is an aggregate random variable capturing party L's popularity for generation t. While we assumed (for simplicity) that pecuniary utility shocks are fully persistent across generations, that is it = i , it = i , and A it =A i , political popularity may change from generation to generation both at the aggregate and at the family level. Each generation, " t will be uniformly distributed on support
, and individual speci…c variables it are uniformly distributed on support
. All random variables are independent. Therefore, in the support of the corresponding random variables, the density function of aggregate popularity of party L is > 0, and familyspeci…c density functions are ' i > 0, and the correlated (aggregate) component of the party identi…cation is assumed less variable than the individual component, that is:
The two parties commit to their candidate tax rates before they know the realization of the random variables " t and it . They only care about winning the election, and hence choose their policies D t and R t by trying to maximize the probability of being elected, p P , P = L, R. This is consistent with maximizing the expected rents from being in o¢ ce 7 .
5 Note that this voting model does not require single peakness of preferences and has other desirable properties. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an excellent presentation of it.
6 Weibull (1987 and . 7 Let P > 0 denote the (non-transferable) ego rent of party P = L, R, from being in
Equilibrium
After simple substitutions, and momentarily neglecting the party L bias component, we obtain the indirect utility function of each individual in each generation. That function ultimately depends on exogenous parameters, on expected taxation and on all the wealth distribution of the previous generation:
It is straightforward to see that (the proof is in Appendix): Lemma 1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium in which the two parties will select the same policy variable, 
As in other probabilistic voting models, the same equilibrium policy variable would also be chosen by a biased social planner who maximized the following weighted aggregate welfare functional:
with each individual's indirect utility function (where e¤ort, consumption, and bequest are all optimal) being weighted inversely to vulnerability, 1=' i , to partyrelated attributes. In the special case of individuals who have the same densities ' i = ', Lemma 1 implies that t = arg max t W ( t ) would coincide with the tax rate chosen by a social planner who adopts a utilitarian welfare functional. Notice that, from eq. (7), the equilibrium tax rate t will depend on generation t 1's bequest distribution k t 1 , generation t 1's fair bequest distribution b k t 1 , and of course the parameter vectors and ; that is t = (k t 1 ; b k t 1 ; ; ).
Intergenerational Links
The equilibrium tax rate t determines the level of capital and fair capital for each family of the current generation. Therefore the link between di¤erent generations is summarized by the dynamics of k it and b k it :
.
Discussion
Note that in eq. (10), "fair" bequest -i.e. of fair initial wealth, over the generations -are obtained by removing from the parental end of life wealth the e¤ects of the "luck"variable, i , and of the taxes paid to and transfers received from the other individuals by government imposition. However, the indirect e¤ect of tax rates on individual e¤orts is included in this de…nition of fairness. The reader may wonder why "(1 t )" should enter the "fair income": after all, it is an individually rational response to the distortion induced by taxation, and indeed e it = (1 t )A i i , If redistribution did not exist in the model, the individual would have exerted a …rst best e¤ort level e F it = A i i . We have run simulations under such a di¤erent view of fairness, based on "potential" rather than actual e¤orts, without much change in the results about the dynamics of k it . By eq. (10), it simpli…es the dynamics of b k it , which would tend to i 1 . However, the results of our computations do not change qualitatively.
Another objection could be raised against purging additive luck i rather than both luck and ability A i . Formally, luck enters additively while ability as the marginal product of e¤ort: both could be viewed as "gifts of nature". Replacing A i with A = R 1 0 A i di would both be reasonable and consistent at the macroeconomic level (fair value added = actual value added). Using Ae it = A(1 t )A i i as the valued added component of the end-of-life wealth, however, would not change the qualitative results much, as actual individual ability, A i , would still enter multiplicatively indirectly via optimal e¤ort choice. Purging this e¤ect too, in addition to neglecting macroeconomic consistency, would not change much 8 .
Intergenerational Dynamics
Starting from an initial vector of actual and fair wealth levels, (k i0 ;k i0 ) i2[0;1] , we can iterate the model and determine the intergenerational evolution of (k it ;k it ) i2[0;1] and t for all t 2 N . We use equations (7), problem (8), and eq.s (9) and (10), which, once iterated for an arbitrary number of generations, allow calculating the whole sequence of equilibrium values of the endogenous variables of our dynamic economy with an arbitrary number of agents, for all parameter vectors, initial wealth distribution, and initial fair wealth distribution. By simulating the model for a su¢ ciently high number of generations, we can approximate the stable steady state value of the endogenous variables associated with each initial condition. The Matlab codes we have used to generate our examples are available upon request.
It is important to notice that generation t's pair of distributions (k it ;k it ) i2[0;1] describe the interaction of real and "ideal" variables at time t. More precisely, the comparison between how society currently is -the actual distribution (k i0 ) i2[0;1] -and how society thinks it "should be" -the fair distribution (k i0 ) i2[0;1] -sets the goals of the political action; together with the method of political competition -i.e. pairwise majority voting -this describes the political ideology prevailing for generation t in that economy. The resulting political equilibrium generates the evolution of (k it+1 ;k it+1 ) i2[0;1] , and therefore the political ideology (i.e policy goals) prevailing in the next generation. Thus we trace the evolution of ideology, fairness and redistribution, as well as the aggregate GDP percapita. We focus our attention on the e¤ects of:
1. di¤erent initial beliefs about the fair wealth distribution (sub-section 3.1). 2. di¤erent initial inequality (section 3.2). 3. alternative formulations of the fairness concepts (section 3.3). 4. di¤erent initial levels of aggregate wealth: poverty traps (section 3.4). 5. temporary shocks to wealth inequality (section 3.5).
Di¤erent Initial Ideas of Social Justice
As suggested by Alesina and Angeletos (2005a) , and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , part of the long term di¤erences in the welfare states in US and Europe can be explained by the interplay of initial conditions and ideas of fairness. A society where citizens believe that the observed cumulated wealth di¤erences are derived from previous family luck will choose to redistribute more than a society in which voters think that the current capital accumulation depended on past e¤orts and talents: the idea of social justice in ‡uences the …scal policy and a¤ects the real variables in the economy. In Europe, preexisting forms of feudalism and wealth related to nobility di¤ered from the US, where modern capitalism developed without a long previous history of privilege and class differences. Marxist thinkers like Engels in fact correctly predicted that precisely for this reason communist parties would have had a harder time in establishing themselves in the US rather than in Europe.
In this section, we simulate the dynamics of two societies, characterized by identical real economic and personal characteristics, but with di¤ erent initial ideas of the fair wealth distribution. In the …rst country, A, every individual of generation 0 believes that all wealth levels of their cohort should be equal to be fair. At the other extreme, the citizens of country B are initially convinced that the prevailing capital distribution is exactly the fair one.
To correctly interpret the simulations in Figure 1a below, the reader should imagine two economies identical in all market fundamentals, including inequality, but that at some point in their history a generation occurred to judge di¤erently the (same!) prevailing wealth distribution. In fact, our "period zero" is simply the start of our period of interest, but, of course, a long history might have preceded the "initial generation" we are considering, which otherwise would have started with no initial capital.
Therefore a di¤erent way of interpreting this results is this: all of the sudden in an unexpected matter a new generation is born with extremely egalitarian views, with a break of the past. Thus we study how a new egalitarian generation of individuals might a¤ect the resulting political equilibrium and economic performance over the subsequent generations. Figure 1a Figure 1a shows that, as a consequence of a perception of unfairness in the initial wealth distribution, country A 0 s voters chose a very high tax rate in period zero. This reduces inequality (even in the …rst period), but it also induces the successive generation to consider unfair the part of their inherited wealths stemming from the redistribution driven unearned changes in their predecessors' wealth. To correct the combined sources of unfairness still requires high taxes for a su¢ ciently long sequence of generations. Meanwhile, this does not take place in country B, where as a consequence work e¤ort is higher and capital accumulation faster.
Individual preferences and the equilibrium tax rate (something we can name ideology) evolve from generation to generation. Consider country A. The …rst generation judges all inequality unfair; the second generation will believe their parents'ideal of their generation's fairness, but it will attribute part of the current pre-tax inequality to the e¤orts and abilities of their generation's members: therefore the desired tax rate will be lower. Incidentally note that the high tax rate chosen by the …rst generation in country A will induce a relatively low choice of e¤ort and work, and therefore the percentage of individual income due to lack is relatively high, thus the tax rate desired by generation 1 will still be relatively high. In country B the …rst generation will not tax inequality because they perceived it as fair. Obviously the chosen tax rate will not be zero due to the need for correcting the e¤ect of luck on unfairness within their cohort. But then the following generation will perceive that some of the inherited inequality is due to luck and therefore will choose to tax it. Unlike country A, since the initial tax rate was quite low much of the inequality within generation 1 will be due to e¤ort, not luck, and therefore the chosen tax rate will not be much higher than in period zero. This shows that the two countries will remain rather di¤erent in terms of policy goals and tax/transfer redistributive schemes for many periods/generations. Initial conditions matter much. Policy goals (ideology) evolve over time together with the evolution of the economy, but initial di¤erences in perception imply long lasting di¤erences across countries.
More precisely, let us review the evolution of ideology implicit in eq. (10):
. Individuals belonging to generation t believe that every member of their cohort should bequeath a wealth level that re ‡ects the bequest parental choice of a fraction, , of their end of life income; however that fraction should have been taken provided they earned the "fair" end-of-life wealth, given by b y it = i (1 t ) + b k it 1 . Thus individuals believe in the idea of fairness of their parents (as from the presence of "+ b k it 1 " in the formula); however, since the term " i (1 t )" is just the equilibrium value of A i e it , they also believe that the additional "fair" income of their peers should only arise from their individual e¤orts and productive abilities. Since, in turn, the e¤ort chosen by the individual turns out to be equal to e it = (1 t )A i i , its level will also re ‡ect the individual's love for work, indeed represented by i . Thus the view of fair versus unfair inequality evolves from generation zero to generation 1 and this will imply di¤erent choices of tax rates and di¤erent bequests. The same considerations apply in the transition from generation 1 to 2, and one can simulate the model forward to trace the transition to a steady state.
As shown in Figure 1b , we can keep track of the level of the variance of the wealth distribution viewed as fair by all the future generations in country A: as we can see, that level increases over time. The o¤spring of a very egalitarian generation, though agreeing with their parent's view of the world of their times, by critically assessing the productive participation by their peers, will become increasingly more tolerant of wealth disparities.
Figure 1b
In summary, di¤erences in ideas of social justice of a generation can persist for several generations. These ideas evolve slowly together with the evolution of the economy.
Multiple long-run equilibria
Thus far we have shown parameter values for which the two economies converge (perhaps after a long time) to the same steady state. But we can also choose parameter values for which the interactions between ideology, policy, and the economy we highlighted so far are strong enough to lead the e¤ects of a one time change in ideology to last forever, that is we can have multiple steady states. This is shown in Figure 1c . Figure 1c As the reader can see from the …gure, the strictly egalitarian ideology prevailing in an initial generation in country A can support a very strong redistributive policy. Such a high taxation would then discourage individual e¤orts so dramatically that a large part of individual's incomes will be the result of luck, and would hence be deemed very unfair. Therefore, the next generation will decide to tax a lot as well. In the long run the unfairness/redistribution/poverty trap will never be corrected, and the two economies will diverge in everything, with country B substantially richer, though more unequal, than country A.
Initial Inequality
In a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's (1981) model, higher initial inequality would lead to more redistribution, higher taxes and lower capital accumulation and growth. This is the prediction of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , and, in a related model, by Persson and Tabellini (1994) . It is straightforward to reproduce this result in our framework. Imagine two countries with di¤erent initial level of inequality and in which there is no di¤erence across countries about how much of the initial inequality is fair or not, and is the same in the two countries. Then there would be higher taxes and more redistribution in the country with more inequality. Simulations along those lines are available from the authors.
However, empirically, the relationship between more inequality and more redistribution has been questioned by Perotti (1996) …rst and then by others.
9
That is, the evidence that more inequality leads to more redistribution is fragile, meaning that in many cases the opposite holds. For instance Alesina and Glaeser (2004) point out that in the US there is at the same time more pre-tax inequality than in Europe and less redistribution. This result, namely a negative relationship between initial inequality and redistribution can be easily obtained in our model as the discussion of the previous sections should have made clear. Imagine two countries, with di¤erent levels of initial inequality, but suppose that in the country with more inequality the latter is considered fair, while in the other country the inequality, even though lower, is considered unfair. Imagine also that in the second country the parameter is especially high, namely in this country citizens are especially averse to inequality (unfairly induced). It is perfectly possible to generate examples in which more inequality leads to less redistribution. One needs di¤erent ratios of fair versus unfair inequality and/or di¤erent weights given in the two countries to the cost of inequality and fairness.
Another reason why inequality may not lead to more but less redistribution is the case when more inequality leads to a stronger in ‡uence of rich voters in the political equilibrium.
10 So far, in our probabilistic voting framework, we have worked under the assumption of common values of ' i for all i 2 [0; 1]. However, this may not be the case, as di¤erent voters are di¤erently reactive to the parties'announcement of di¤erent policies, based on the relative importance they give to ideological and personal characteristics associated with the di¤erent parties. Our model allows all possible assumptions about the individual political biases. Obviously, every assumption likely a¤ects how constituencies respond to each party's political platform, thereby a¤ecting the policy announced by o¢ ce motivated candidates. It is easy to check that when the rich have larger political in ‡uence and when wealth is correlated to more political in ‡uence redistribution is lower. This will of course imply higher growth a larger Gini. All the simulations regarding these cases are available upon request.
Di¤erent views about what is fair
In this section we analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent views about fairness, by comparing three countries.
1) Country A is our benchmark case and we assume = 0:1. Thus individuals in country A have preferences described by eq.s (5) and (6); 2) Country B where issues of fairness and inequality aversion play no role so that = 0: This the traditional Meltzer Richard case in which redistribution occurs only for sel…sh reasons, namely the poor want to tax the rich;
3) Country C, where the individuals are averse to inequality per se, as measured by the variance of end-of-life post-tax wealth, w it , , individuals in country C have preferences for redistribution in which:
In Figure 2 we compare the performance of economies with everything else equal, but the three di¤erent concept of social justice. Figure 2 As in the …gure, country B immediately starts with no redistribution (the tax rate always stays on the horizontal axis: B t = 0, for all t (= 1; 2; :::), whereas countries A and C tends to a steady state with positive redistribution. The reason why the usual inequality-redistribution channel is not apparent in country B is the presence of probabilistic party loyalty, along with the symmetric party bias among the citizens. However, positive taxation is immediately obtained also in the = 0 case as soon as we introduce asymmetric policy bias. Thus the fact that in this experiment B t = 0 is just a special case, but in any case country B would have lower taxes than countries A and C. In our example, country B will become persistently richer than country A, which in turn gets richer than country C. Country A's tax rate tends to 32.63%, while country C's tax rate tends to 50.38%. This may suggest that the persistent di¤erences between the European (country C) and American (country A) ideologies may regard inequality per se (Europe) versus undeserved inequality (US).
In both countries A and C we note an inverse relationship between Gini coe¢ cient and mean income, while the country which does not redistribute, B; shows a positive relationship between the two.
Poverty Traps
By poverty trap we mean a situation in which a country does not manage to exit poverty because the policies induced by poverty itself are not growth enhancing. There are many channels that may lead to poverty traps. Here we emphasize one related to incentive to redistribute due to fairness considerations.
11 Consider two economies sharing the same distribution of luck, willingness to work, and inner abilities, but di¤erent initial levels and distributions of capital and fair capital. Assume that one economy, A, starts from a low and unequal level of capital endowment; while the other, B, from a high and similarly unequal level of capital endowment, as shown in Figure 3a : Figure 3a In both countries the initial level of fair wealth is set equal to the actual initial wealth distribution 12 . This example is representative of cases in which, when the country is poor, the luck component represent a larger share of realized income, and this induces the voters to prefer a high level of taxation. The poorer country starts with a higher redistribution, while the rich country simply increases redistribution at a lower pace. This in turn disincentives e¤orts and capital accumulation, thereby causing lower aggregate wealth accumulation. The country is cast for long into a poverty trap; with high taxes and low income.
Eventually, after some generations, in the previous …gure, the poorer country starts slowly to accumulate more capital and to vote for reducing tax rates. Growth starts to increase and the poorer country starts to catch up with the other country's level of capital and taxation. The evolution of the concept of fairness plays a very important role also in this case. As the generations pass by, the agents in the poorer country start to consider more and more fair the di¤erences in the capital accumulation deriving by the abilities and the e¤orts. In this way taxation reduces and the capital accumulation can …nally begin.
However, by slightly altering the parameters, we can show examples in which the poverty trap is more extreme, as shown in Figure 3b below 13 : Figure 3b 1 3 To generate this kind of examples, it su¢ ces to slightly increase the value of and to slightly increase the dispersion of the luck distribution.
In this example, we have assumed that country B starts ten times poorer than country A, while both countries believed their own initial wealth distribution to be fair (to avoid adding interfering ingredients). In country B, sheer poverty implies that a large part of people end-of-life wealth is due to luck, which causes the election of very highly redistributive policy platforms. Once in place, they will discourage individual e¤orts, thereby causing luck to play a central role in individual enrichment; this in turn reinforces the perception of unfairness in the wealth distribution, and corroborates drastically redistributive policies, thus perpetuating the poverty trap. Country B will never catch up with country A: it will rather converge to a di¤erent steady state wealth distribution, characterized by more poverty, more taxation, and less inequality. It should be noted that very poor countries often do not have a well developed tax structure. Often in these countries redistributive policies take even more distorting forms often associated with corruption and many cases ethnic politics. All the factors would make matters even worse and increase the chances of a poverty trap.
Shocks to Wealth Distribution
Inequality is generally a slow moving variable, but a few large events can a¤ect it quite much for a few years. Wars have been one example of such events, which have reduced wealth disparities by much. (Piketty and Saez, 2003) . The …nancial crisis of 2007-2009 may also have deep e¤ects on inequality, both on its actual measure and the perception of fairness of certain types of riches accumulated in …nancial markets pre crisis. What are the e¤ects on …scal policy and the evolution of inequality of these shocks? The next two sections show that opposite e¤ects on policy may arise, depending on how the wealthy classes'losses are judged by the voters.
Shocks which equalize capital holdings
We can trace the e¤ect of a shock in our stylized economy, by assuming that at some date -say, generation 4 -in country B -otherwise identical to country A -there is a shock that cuts all initial capital levels at a ceiling equal to 70% of the highest inherited capital level. We maintain the assumption of initial distribution viewed as fair. Figure 4 shows what would happen without the shock (country A) and with the shock (case B): Figure 4 Since the shock is equalizing wealth levels, there is a temporary negative e¤ect on the equilibrium tax rate due to the fairness motive: "too rich" wealth levels would be curtailed by the shock while "too poor" wealths are relieved by tax reduction. The reduction in redistribution is voted as soon as the shock arrives and allows the economy to witness only a relatively weak negative temporary e¤ect on income and on inequality. The economy will re-absorb them completely within few generations. Moreover, the lower level of inequality following the shock has relatively persistent negative e¤ects on voted taxation and positive e¤ects on capital accumulation. In fact, for example, in the 10th generation (6 generations after the shock) tax rate in country A is 28.54% while in country B is 27.79%; similarly, country B's per-capita income is 1.19% higher than country A's per-capita income.
Shocks which equalize individuals'productivities
Suppose now that the top individual abilities are curtailed: we will assume that for one generationt (in the example of the …guret = 4) we have it = min{ i , 0:60 max j2[0;1] j }. That is, we set a temporary ceiling for the abilities/stamina equal to 60% of their highest level in normal times. Lower abilities are left unchanged. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects: Figure 5 As we can notice in the …gure, in country A there is no crisis, while in country B the shock arrives. As a consequence there is a relatively strong fall in the growth rate of country B. Unlike in …gure 4, here the crisis is followed by an increase in redistribution: despite the crisis'equalizing power, country B's voters choose more redistribution and higher tax rates. Why so? Fairness considerations tilt …scal policy in favour of higher redistribution: if it is not creativity or hard work that pays o¤ the rich so much, then the relative importance of unjusti…ed "luck" (which may include all sorts of non-work related sources of extra gains/losses 14 ) increases. Therefore, the perception of unfairness in the creation of wealth would be mounting, thereby inducing voters to increase redistribution and exacerbate the economic consequences of the crisis. As shown in the example illustrated by Figure 5 , in the generation after the crisis (generation 5), country A's tax rate is 25.97% while country B's tax rate is 31.5%. Moreover, as the …gure shows, these e¤ects could be persistent, which is not too surprising once realized that higher tax rates introduce additional departures from fairness, to be corrected by the next generation, and so on.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how the evolution of the political ideology regarding the fairness of the constellation of income and wealth in society can generate economic and political persistence in inequality, redistribution, and growth. According to our simple framework, ideology does not entail cognitive distortions of reality 15 , but it shapes the moral judgement on what wealth distribution would be fair, as well as it internalizes into people's preferences how strongly the distance between the current wealth distribution and the fair one makes people unhappy. Our model allows us to make sense formally of a variety of observations about the relationship between inequality, redistribution, and persistence of poverty which would be otherwise inconsistent with more standard models of redistributive policies.
Rather than reviewing again our results it is worth discussing possible extensions to this framework. Probably the most interesting one would be to extend the possible tax transfer schemes available to correct inequality. A particularly relevant one comes to mind, namely inheritance taxation. This model with its emphasis on fairness seems ideal to address issues of social justice like equalizing initial conditions versus redistribution. That is, an alternative view about social justice could be that everybody should start from the same initial conditions, and therefore inherited wealth, no matter how generated, should be heavily taxed to equalize everybody at birth. This of course would have implications on savings, capital accumulation, and the amount of bequest, but the structure provided by this model seems ideal to study this set of issues. Another generalization would be to allow non linear tax structures to permit for more progressive income and wealth taxation.
An additional extension would be to consider more than one voting within each generation, that is to break the identi…cation of one period with one generation. The Matlab codes we have produced allow this extension quite easily and we do not expect signi…cant changes in the qualitative nature of the results, but some interesting re…nements of the dynamics may emerge, especially in a model where one has both income taxes and inheritance taxation.
5 Appendix Lemma 1. In pairwise majority voting, there will exist a unique equilibrium in which the two parties will select the same policy variable, 
Proof. In fact, individual i of generation t will vote for party R ifÛ it (
Given our assumption on it , this event happens with probability
2 . Aggregating over all individuals and using the law of large numbers, the fraction of votes that goes to party R is: R = 
